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Investing in Hospitality Operations in the 
People's Republic of China: 
The Legal Framework 
by 
Bruce S. Urdang 
In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China announced its "Open Door 
Policy. "After being closed to the outside world for decades, the Western world was 
not certain what to make of this turnaround. The author looks at a number of ques- 
tions: Was China sincere in its statements that it wanted foreign investment on its 
soil? Was it willing to provide the economic and legal framework within which for- 
eign investors could feel secure about placing their investment dollars? What con- 
cerns or issues still remain with regard to such investment decisions today? 
In 1979, the Chinese government took the first step toward creat- 
ing the legal structure necessary to attract foreign investment with 
the promulgation of the Joint Venture Law. The JV Law meant that 
for the first time the Chinese government had codified its allowance 
of joint ventures owned at least in part by foreigners. The ventures 
contemplated by the JV Law were to be those designed to promote the 
development of China's economy and the raising of scientific and tech- 
nical levels. Only certain broad categories of industry were to be per- 
mitted, however. The classic manufacturing and high technology 
industries that China so badly needed were included. Also included 
were tourism and service trades. Thus, the hospitality industry was 
welcomed. 
The JV Law, in addition to enabling the existence ofjoint ventures, 
did provide some guidelines to foreign investors in detailing how such 
organizations were to be formed and managed. For example, joint ven- 
tures must obtain government approval to operate. China, long re- 
nowned for its large and cumbersome bureaucracy, has not created any 
type of streamlined procedure for securing such approval. Thus, the 
process is time consuming and confusing. The partners must convince 
the government that the venture will be good for the country by pro- 
viding the government with a project proposal and a feasibility study. 
If approval is granted, the next step involves the preparation of the 
joint venture agreement and articles of association. 
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Once validly formed, the law provides that the venture will be con- 
sidered a legal entity in China and that the entity will enjoy limited 
liability. The western equivalent is that of a corporation wherein the 
shareholders are not individually liable for the debts and obligations of 
the corporate entity 
Capitalization of the venture is also controlled. The Joint Venture 
Law provides that at least 25 percent of the venture's capital must 
come from the foreign partner. The capital may take any one (or more) 
of several forms. Cash, tangible assets and even intangible assets such 
as expertise in areas such as management or finance are permitted. In 
fact, such "capital" is widely sought after in China. It is one effective 
way to increase the skills of both local management and labor. The 
Chinese partner will more often than not contribute the land upon 
which the venture is to operate. Ownership of the land remains with 
the state; therefore, the land contribution takes the form of use, rather 
than ownership. 
Profit distribution is likewise controlled. The JV Law states that 
profits will be distributed in proportion to each partner's capital con- 
tribution, after the payment of income tax. The tax structure in China, 
though, is set up to provide some very attractive benefits. For exam- 
ple, certain areas of the country have been set aside by the government 
as Special Economic Zones. These are located mostly in the southern 
part of the country, with the city of Shanghai as the most prominent 
example. 
Before the communists took over in 1949, Shanghai served as the 
commercial heart of Western colonialism on the Asian continent. The 
waterfront, known as the Bund, once housed the banks and trading 
firms that earned Shanghai the nickname "Paris of the East." Those 
buildings still exist today and the Chinese government has been seek- 
ing buyers, or tenants, to be more precise. The price tags have been 
quite high, though. However, with some quite significant tax incen- 
tives, the revitalization of Shanghai as a major player in the Asian 
economic scheme could occur. According to "Shanghai's Foreign 
Economic Rules and Regulation 1982-1990," foreign investments in 
the development zones enjoy preferential treatment. No local income 
tax will be assessed. That tax waiver is set to expire at the end of 
1995, although it might very well be extended. No real estate tax is 
levied against businesses in the Special Economic Zones for five 
years, beginning with the month they begin operations. Enterprises 
involved in the construction of infrastructure also will receive prefer- 
ential treatment, including similar tax breaks along with favorable 
land use treatment. 
The JV Law goes on to address other specifics of the venture's oper- 
ations. A bank approved by the government must be used. First prior- 
ity must be given to sourcing material from within the country. End 
products are strongly encouraged to be exported rather than sold 
domestically. This is obviously required so that China may acquire the 
foreign currency it desperately needs. 
8 FIU Hospitality Review 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 14, Number 2, 1996
Contents © 1996 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any artwork,
editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.
Despite the somewhat onerous government regulation of the joint 
venture, the economic opportunity presented has lured substantial for- 
eign investment. In 1992, foreign investment was estimated to be 
approximately $3.4 billion, more than the previous 12 years combined. 
In 1993, this number more than doubled, reaching the $7 billion mark. 
The first quarter of 1994 was also strong at $2 billion. 
Drawbacks Do Exist to Investing in China 
In 1983, the "bare bones" of the 1979 JV Law were supplemented 
by a set of regulations designed to give greater substance to the Law. 
In 1990, actual amendments to the JV Law were adopted. Despite 
what appears to be the government's good faith attempts to alleviate 
western fears about investing substantial dollars in the PRC, some sig- 
nificant, and, for some investors, insurmountable problems remain. 
Probably the greatest fear any foreign investor will have is the pos- 
sibility that some day the Chinese government will nationalize hislher 
business. The taking of private property by government for a public 
purpose is not a concept foreign to western law. In the United States, 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the taking of pri- 
vate property by the government without "just" compensation. 
Therefore, even a purely domestic enterprise in the United States is 
subjected to the possibility that someday it might be forced by the gov- 
ernment to give up its business. However, at least the U.S. business or 
property owner is guaranteed "just" compensation. 
Whether or not the same, or a substantially similar, safeguard 
exists as to the foreign partner's investment in a Chinese joint venture 
is questionable. The 1990 JV Law amendments attempted to alleviate 
that fear. These amendments included a provision wherein the 
Chinese government agreed not to "nationalize" any joint venture 
without a "public purpose." They further stated that, should such 
nationalization occur, the owner would be entitled to "appropriate com- 
pensation." Exactly what the phrase "appropriate compensation" 
means is unclear. In the United States, the term "just" compensation 
has been held to mean the owner will be entitled to the fair market 
value of the property taken by the government. This concept is often 
litigated, most often in the context of eminent domain proceedings 
(often referred to as "condemnation" proceedings) in which the gov- 
ernment is taking private property for a public purpose (a roadway). 
The litigation most often concerns not whether the government has 
the right to "take" the property, but how much compensation is "just." 
Normally, expert appraisal evidence is admitted and a jury is asked to 
determine, based upon the testimony, how much the owner could have 
gotten in an arm's length transaction. 
Whether the use of the term "appropriate" compensation as used 
in the 1990 amendments to the JV Law is the equivalent of the term 
"just" compensation is doubtfid. The term "appropriate" implies a sub- 
jective standard which does not include the notion of "fair market 
value." It seems to give the Chinese government a license to decide 
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what is appropriate without reference to any outside criteria. Had the 
1990 amendments to the JV Law instead used the term "adequate" or 
"just" compensation, it would have implied western notions of fair 
market value and put the investing public more at  ease. 
As it stands now, the nationalization provisions of the 1990 amend- 
ments were at least an attempt to put such fears of western investors 
to rest. That purpose has been only partially achieved. The concept 
which should probably make foreign investors least fearful of nation- 
alization of their investments without fair compensation is the reality 
that the Chinese government must know that, should a foreign 
investor be unfairly compensated if hislher investment is taken, the 
chilling effect that would have on future foreign investment would be 
substantial. Perhaps that is also why, at present, it is not clearly 
known how the PRC would compensate a foreign investor; it has not 
yet occurred. 
Term Limits Exist in China 
The length of time that a foreign joint venture may remain on 
Chinese soil has been a problem in the past and remains so today. 
Western notions of corporate existence almost uniformly include per- 
petual existence. The articles of incorporation of almost any domestic 
corporation include a provision that the existence of the corporation 
shall be perpetual. Continuity of existence is one of the hallmarks of 
corporate existence. In fact, a major reason why one might wish to 
incorporate one's business is that it continues beyond one's own mor- 
tal existence. 
Pursuant to the 1979 JV Law, the term of the joint venture had to be 
specifically set forth in the articles of association. Typically, term limits 
were 10 to 15 years, perhaps longer, depending upon the scope of the pro- 
ject. Any extension of the term had to be approved by the government. 
The amendments to the JV Law did help. The partners were given 
the right to determine the term of the venture. Most importantly, how- 
ever, no longer did the law set maximum term limits. The effect was to 
create the possibility that the venture could remain in China indefi- 
nitely. That possibility remains just that, however, a mere possibility. 
The government can still decide which ventures will be permitted to 
remain in perpetuity, and it could change its mind as it sees fit. If the 
government behaves as it traditionally has, those ventures which 
engage in those industries that China most needs will be the ones that 
stay. The others will be terminated. The amendments attempt to allay 
investors' fears, but do so only to a limited extent. 
Dispute Resolution Methods Are Also Different 
Western notions of dispute resolution are not favored in the PRC. 
Traditionally, and one should not underestimate the influence of tra- 
dition in Chinese culture, only "face-saving" methods would be accept- 
able. That is, China favors dispute resolution methods which do not 
have, at  their conclusion, a "winner" and a "loser." Thus, the 1979 JV 
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Law encouraged the resolution of disputes through mediation or con- 
ciliation. Resort to litigation was not provided for. 
The 1983 Regulations did attempt to accommodate more western 
dispute resolution options. These stipulated that only after mediation or 
conciliation had failed could litigation be commenced. Although resort to 
the courts was provided for, just as the Chinese government's attempts 
to assuage western investors' concerns with regard to nationalization 
and the length of a JV's term failed to go far enough, so did this attempt. 
The defect was in which forums were made available. Only resort 
to Chinese courts was permitted. Such a restriction has caused signif- 
icant concern with foreign investors. Probably the greatest concern is 
the one which strikes fear into the heart of every litigator and every 
litigant, the fear of bias by the court in favor of its own citizens, in legal 
jargon, the fear of being '3ometowned." That fear exists even with 
regard to purely domestic disputes on both an interstate and 
intrastate level. In the United States, if a dispute exists between citi- 
zens of different states, a federal court will have the jurisdiction to 
hear that case. If the litigants in that same case happen to be from the 
same state, the federal court could not hear that case. That rule, 
referred to as diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, developed to allow 
the judge with no hometownlstate affiliation, the federal judge, to hear 
the case so that the loser could not claim that he lost because the judge 
was biased in favor of the litigant from the judge's home state. If the 
foreign JV partner has no choice but to litigate before a Chinese court, 
that fear becomes a reality. 
A second effect of being forced to litigate in China is the removal 
from the parties to the JV agreement of a significant aspect of freedom 
of contract. The right of the parties to select the forum of any future 
dispute along with the body of law which would govern is taken away. 
In the United States, most contracts will contain choice of law and 
choice of forum provisions. The agreed upon contract terms are gener- 
ally respected by the courts and are enforced as written. In fact, such 
provisions can often be extremely important. Since laws vary signifi- 
cantly from state to state, the body of law applied can oRen determine 
the outcome of the case. Removing that right to choose from the par- 
ties is significant. 
Finally, the Chinese judicial system is not nearly as well developed 
or established as western judicial systems. Procedures for accessing 
the system and provisions for enforcement of judgments obtained are 
weak and, for the most part, inadequate. In short, for the foreign 
investor, resolution to the courts of the PRC is not very comforting. 
Foreign Exchange Problems Exist 
Before investing in a Chinese joint venture, the foreign JV partner, 
and any investors, must be assured that any profits earned by the 
operations in China can be transferred out of the PRC into the hands 
of the investors as returns on their investment. Absent such assur- 
ances, the incentive to invest is lacking. 
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There is no prohibition against the foreign partner remitting 
earned foreign exchange outside the PRC. However, because Chinese 
currency (called "Renminbi") is not freely convertible into foreign cur- 
rency, while foreign currency can be converted to Renminbi, practical 
problems are created. 
Transferring the currency itself is obviously of no use for it cannot be 
converted to other currency and therefore cannot be used. The only way 
to remove profits from the PRC is if those profits are already in a foreign 
currency. While much of the JV's earnings may be in non-Chinese cur- 
rency because the product is exported, as strongly encouraged by the JV 
Law, much of the earnings will be in Renminbi. Some fairly creative 
solutions have been resorted to with varying degrees of success. 
One strategy has been to attempt to manufacture those goods 
which the PRC normally imports. If a partially foreign-owned joint 
venture could sell its product to another Chinese enterprise that 
otherwise would have had to import that item, the JV has a ready cus- 
tomer. The Chinese government would not object because that buyer 
no longer needs to import the item, which would require sending valu- 
able foreign currency out of the PRC. In addition, even though the 
transaction will not result in the JV earning foreign currency, which it 
could then send out of the country to its investors, it could use the 
Renminbi earned to purchase its needs locally, thereby obviating the 
need to purchase those same items with foreign currency. 
Another strategy has been to enter into agreements with other 
Chinese entities using barter, or like-kind exchanges, instead of cur- 
rency. The result is that the JV need not use its foreign currency to pay 
other Chinese ventures. 'Ib those entities without foreign partners, it 
does not matter that it is not going to receive its consideration in the 
form of currency readily exchangeable on the world market. 
Conversely, it is extremely important to the foreign JV partner that all 
of its foreign currency be available for distribution outside the country. 
Investing in the People's Republic of China is by no means a sim- 
ple or risk-free proposition. Despite the Chinese government's good 
faith efforts to "westernize" the investing climate, significant problems 
remain. One cannot overstate the need for experienced legal advice 
when considering such a venture. The rules are not the same, yet it is 
fair to say that, at the very least, there are rules in the People's 
Republic of China today 
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